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Abstract—With the success of the Cyber Grand Challenge
(CGC) sponsored by DARPA, the topic of Autonomous Cyber
Reasoning System (CRS) has recently attracted extensive at-
tention from both industry and academia. Utilizing automated
system to detect, exploit and patch software vulnerabilities
seems so attractive because of its scalability and cost-efficiency
compared with the human expert based solution. In this paper, we
give an extensive survey of former representative works related to
the underlying technologies of a CRS, including vulnerability de-
tection, exploitation and patching. As an important supplement,
we then review several pioneer studies that explore the potential
of machine learning technologies in this field, and point out that
the future development of Autonomous CRS is inseparable from
machine learning.
Index Terms—cyber reasoning system, vulnerability detection,
vulnerability exploitation, vulnerability patching, machine learn-
ing
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of information technology,
software is playing an important role in various aspects all
over the world, such as the economy, military, society, etc.
At the same time, software security is becoming an emerging
worldwide challenge. Software vulnerabilities are one of the
root causes of security problems. High skilled hackers can
exploit the software vulnerabilities to do a lot of harmful
things, such as stealing the private information of users, halting
the crucial equipments and so on. According to the statistics
released by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
organization, the number of software vulnerabilities discovered
in 1999 was less than 1600 while the number of vulnerabilities
currently covered by CVE and National Vulnerability Database
(NVD) almost nearly 100000 [1]. Facing massive software
vulnerabilities, developers have neither sufficient time nor
enough resources to fix all of them. So there is the question:
which bugs are exploitable and thus should be fixed first [2]?
Given that, the primary task in software security is to find the
security-critical bugs and fix them.
However, finding and patching software vulnerabilities are
highly professional works. The number of developers who can
handle these jobs is far from enough compared to the number
of software vulnerabilities. Therefore, the need for automated,
scalable, machine-speed vulnerability detection and patching is
becoming urgent when there are millions of software systems
launched every day today.
To this end, DARPA held the CGC in 2016, which not only
showed us an impressive scene that machines are effectively
hacking against each other, but also dramatically promoted
the progress of automatic software vulnerabilities detection,
exploitation and patching techniques. Meanwhile, with the
tremendous development of artificial intelligence announced
by Google [3], we can see new opportunities that the soft-
ware security problems can be solved by computing systems
automatically and intelligently.
From this point, we give an extensive study of former repre-
sentative works related to the underlying techniques of a CRS
including vulnerability detection, exploitation and patching.
Although some researchers like Brooks [4] has proposed a
survey taken based on two CRS instances which are Mayhem
and Mechanical Phish in this area, our work is different from
theirs in several ways. First, we review these works from the
perspective of both timeline and categorization. Second, as an
important supplement, we then review several pioneer studies
that explore the potential of machine learning technologies in
this field. At last, our survey focuses on the state-of-the-art
works. TABLE I gives an overview of these techniques.
II. AUTOMATIC VULNERABILITY DETECTION
The prevalence of vulnerabilities and the seriousness of
their consequences have prompted researchers to focus more
attention on digging vulnerabilities. From the perspective of
whether to run the program being tested, vulnerability detec-
tion techniques can be roughly divided into three categories:
static analysis, dynamic analysis and mixed analysis.
A. Static Analysis
Static analysis reasons about a program without executing
it [4]. The general process of binary static analysis is shown
in Fig. 1. And as shown in Fig. 1, from the perspective of
program modeling, we split it into two categories based on
the modeling of static analysis: graph-based static analysis
and static analysis with data modeling. We then will introduce
them in detail.
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1) Graph-based static analysis: Graph-based static anal-
ysis refers to modeling program properties as graphs such
as control-flow graphs (CFG), data-flow graphs (DFG) and
program-dependence graphs (PDG), etc. These techniques rely
on building a model of bugs by a set of nodes in the CFG or
PDG to identify bugs in a program [5]. For example, Vine,
the static analysis component of BitBlaze, which provides a
set of core utilities for vulnerability detection, such as CFG,
DFG and weakest precondition calculation, etc [6]. Yamaguchi
et al. [7] construct a code property graph that combines
CFG and PDG to implement effective vulnerability detection.
Angr exposes the CFG recovery algorithms as two analyses:
CFGFast and CFGAccurate [8]. This core component CFG
provides the system with the ability to examine all possible
program paths so that static analysis can achieve high coverage
and also can reduce about thirty percent to seventy percent of
software security issues from the root.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF RECENT TECHNOLOGIES ON VULNERABILITY DETECTION,
EXPLOITATION AND PATCHING
Specific Technology Advantages Disadvantages
Static
Analysis
lack of run-time
information of
the program
high code coverage
Dynamic
Analysis
Fuzzing: AFL, AFLFast,
AFLGo, etc fast low code coverage
DTA: DTA, TEMU, DTA++,
etc
Mixed
Analysis concolic: DART, CUTE,Driller
fast, high code
coverage path explosion
Automatic
Vulnerability
Detection
Automatic
Vulnerability
Exploitation
Patch-Based
Exploits
Generation
Control Flow
Hijacking
Exploits
Generation
APEG
AEG, Q, PloyAEG, Rex, etc
scaling up to
multiple paths
patch dependency,
the inability to
construct control
flow hijacking
construct control
flow hijacking too many defensesolutions
FlowStitch, DOP Turing-complete
need better
deep semantic
understanding
Data-Oriented
Exploits
Generation
Graph-based static
analysis
Static analysis with
data modeling
Automatic
Vulnerability
Patching
Machine
Learning
Runtime
State-based
Repair
Detect-based
Repair
Monitor: Clearview, etc
Rollback: Rx,
REASSURE, etc
solve bug quilkly correct bugnot radically
Input Filter: TAP,etc
Search-based Repair:
GenProg, PAR, etc
Statistical debugging
metrics: SemFix, etc
Standard Semantics
Better quality of
patches high computation
—— Deep Learning:LSTM、GRU, etc
End-to-End,
no intervention,
Accuracy higher
slow, high cost
Model checking also belongs to graph-based static analysis,
which refers to modeling the behavior of a program as a
graph. Model checking is used in a variety of tools like slam
and cboc, etc. And it has a high level of automation and
complete theory but has the space-time overhead problems
due to state explosion. Similarly, most methods of graph-
based static analysis always meet the same problems that the
solving model is too big so that the practical solution is not
computable. To improve computation efficiency, researchers
propose a different way of static analysis that reason over
abstractions of the data upon which a program operates [5],
which will be introduced in the following paragraph.
Binary
Execution
Assembler
IL
Modeling
Analysis
Vulnerabilities
Security
Strategy
Fig. 1. General Process of Binary Static Analysis
2) Static analysis with data modeling: P. Cousot and R.
Cousot [9] proposed an Abstract Interpretation (AI) method
based lattice theory in 1977 to simplify and approximate
the calculation of fixed points. Essentially, it is to achieve a
balance between computational efficiency and computational
accuracy so that AI lays a theoretical foundation for static
analysis with data modeling. AI implemented in the astree
static analyzer, to a certain extent, can alleviate the state
explosion problem.
In this field, we consider a popular and AI-based method
named Value-Set Analysis (VSA). The key to VSA is that it
exceeds the approximation of the values in memory. Therefore
VSA can be used to make assumptions about targets of
an indirect jump statement. The original design of VSA is
proposed by Balakrishnan et al. [10]. Later LoongChecker
[11] uses an accurate VSA to find out addresses to solve
both indirect control transfers and alias problems as many
as possible. Then, Josselin Feist et al. [12] present a static
tool called GUEB, which uses VSA to reason each variable
in the assignment and free instructions based on an abstract
memory model to search for use-after-free vulnerabilities in
binary programs.
Apart from VSA, another paradigm of static analysis with
data modeling is patch matching, which refers to the similarity
comparison between the original program and the program
with patching to get the difference part. Patch matching is a
popular method in recent years. It has significant theoretical
and empirical support. For example, Li et al. [13] propose
a mechanism that is syntax-based to perform well for code
clone vulnerability. Sha et al. [14] present an automatic Patch-
based Vulnerability Description (PVD), and it proved that
all patch-related bugs can be described in PVD. Xu et al.
[15] construct a patch analysis framework named SPAIN,
which can automatically learn the security patch patterns and
vulnerability patterns to identify and locate the vulnerability
patches. Patch matching will narrow the scope of positioning,
and thus it does not need to locate vulnerabilities throughout
the whole program. It also has been widely used in various
tools like Klockwork, Prefix, Coverity and Fortify, etc.
The most common characteristic of the above methods is
that they can achieve a high code coverage of the program,
which is the advantage of static analysis. While there is also an
inherent flaw in the static analysis: the lack of necessary run-
time information for the program. To achieve better runtime
information utilization, dynamic analysis is put forward.
B. Dynamic Analysis
The dynamic analysis examines a program’s behavior while
it is running in a given environment. Fuzzing and dynamic taint
analysis are two typical dynamic analysis technologies.
1) Fuzzing: Fuzzing is an automated technique of black-
box testing, which is a process of sending intentionally invalid
data to a product in the hope of triggering an error condition or
fault to determine whether there are potential security vulnera-
bilities [16]. Fuzzing does not require any program analysis so
that it is fast and can generate multiple tests at the same time
but with low coverage. As a representative of automated white-
box testing, SAGE [17] is proposed by Microsoft Research
to achieve a balance between code coverage and efficiency
by repeatedly using the generational search algorithm with a
coverage-maximizing heuristic design. Godefroid et al. [17]
use it to discover more than 20 unknown vulnerabilities in
large Windows applications to validate its effectiveness. But
white-box fuzzing requires binary lifting and program analysis,
which may result in bad efficiency. Hence researchers propose
the grey-box fuzzing which lies in between the white box
analysis and the black box analysis. Without the program
analysis but with more information about the internal structure,
grey-box fuzzing may be more effective than white and black
box analysis [18].
Grey-box fuzzing is considered as the state-of-the-art tech-
nology in vulnerability detection [19]. American Fuzzy Lop
(AFL) is its popular implementation that has detected hundreds
of high-impact vulnerabilities. One of the limitations of AFL
is that its mutation engine is syntax-blind, so there are many
technologies trying to extend AFL. For instance, AFLFast [18]
and AFLGo [19] use the knowledge of Markov chain and
simulated annealing algorithm respectively to extend AFL.
And from the above extension of AFL, we can see a new trend
that the methods based on machine learning are becoming
popular and powerful in software security.
2) Dynamic Taint Analysis: Taint analysis was first pro-
posed by Denning in 1976 [20]. While the Dynamic Taint
Analysis (DTA) was formally proposed in 2005 by James
Newsome and Dawn Song [21]. DTA refers to tracking and
analyzing marked information flow through the program as
it executes. The reliability of DTA is verified by utilizing
TaintCheck, and it is proved that DTA can detect most of
the types of vulnerabilities. To improve the applicability and
scalability of DTA, general frameworks are developed by
researchers such as Dytan and TEMU. However, Schwartz et
al. [22] point out that there are several fundamental challenges
for DTA to achieve accurate analysis results. And the two main
challenges are under-tainting and over-tainting.
Facing these problems, many optimization methods for
DTA are proposed. For example, DTA++ [23] is put forward
to resolve under-tainting without causing over-tainting by
identifying a minimum set of implicit flows in the program
that potentially cause under-tainting. DECAF [24] keeps track
of taint labels at bit granularity in an asynchronous manner,
which enables precise and lossless dynamic taint analysis.
And also, Ma Jin-Xin et al. [25] pose a method based on
offline indices of instruction trace to enhance DTA, and their
method is verified to be efficiency. It is able to detect more
vulnerabilities than TEMU, and is 5 times faster in average.
Dynamic analysis has higher accuracy than static analysis
by analysing the runtime information but at the expense of
less code coverage [4]. The combination of dynamic and static
analysis (i.e., mixed analysis) hereby come up with the target
to achieve better analysis.
C. Mixed Analysis
The mixed analysis has almost become a necessity for all
competitive teams in the CGC competition, which indicate that
the mixed analysis is a powerful way in software security.
There are many automatic methods proposed by researchers.
DART [26], CUTE [27], EXE [28], KLEE [29] and SAGE [17]
are the typical representative of this area. The state-of-the-art
technique, called concolic execution, is to have the concrete
execution drive the symbolic execution. Concolic analysis
maintains a concrete state and a symbolic state. It executes
a program starting with some given or random inputs that act
on conditional statements to gather symbolic constraints along
the execution. Then it uses a constraint solver to infer variants
of the precious inputs in order to steer the next execution of
the program towards an alternative execution path [30].
A key advantage of concolic analysis tools is that the use
of concrete values can alleviate the imprecision caused by the
interaction with external code or constraint solving timeouts.
However they are still facing a serious challenge, that is,
path explosion. There are two ways to solve the problem:
The first one is to combining online and offline (concolic)
execution to obtain the best of both worlds. Mayhem [31]
is a hybrid symbolic execution system that uses this way. It
can context-switch quickly between states during the online
exploration, while extraneous states are swapped to disk and
explored in a new exploration [2]. The second one is to using
concolic analysis to assist Fuzzing analysis. For example,
Istvan Haller et al. [32] develop Dowser, which proposes a new
search algorithm with aiming to maximize pointer coverage to
alleviate path explosion problem. And the typical and popular
tool in this way is Driller proposed by Nick Stephens et al.
[33] that combined AFL and concolic analysis to solve the path
explosion problem. The above two ways attempt to go around
path explosion by reducing the burden on the constraint solver.
However it can not solve the problem fundamentally, and thus
it would be a challenging topic for our future research.
III. AUTOMATIC VULNERABILITY EXPLOITATION
Due to economic reasons, there are only a limited number
of patches that can be actually deployed. Choosing which
vulnerability to address becomes a critical challenge [34]. So
the most important issue in software security is to find the
security-critical bugs and fix them as soon as possible, which
automatic vulnerability exploitation is in charge.
Automatic vulnerability exploits generation is an important
and effective means to discover and verify bugs in a program.
The existing methods can be classified into three categories
roughly: Patch-Based Exploit Generation, Control Flow Hi-
jacking Exploits Generation and Data-Oriented Exploits Gen-
eration [35]. This section will describe these three methods in
detail.
A. Patch-Based Exploits Generation
A vulnerability often gets reproduced due to the frequent
code reuse by programmers. Security patches are often not
propagated to all code clones, but they could be leveraged to
exploit unknown vulnerabilities [13]. Having early access to
a patch may confer advantages to an attacker. A scheme of
patch-based exploits generation is put forward by researchers
in which the typical method is Automatic Patch-based Exploit
Generation (APEG). APEG is proposed by David Brumley
et al. [36], and it is verified to be possible by successfully
being used to generate exploits for 5 real-world vulnerabilities.
However, from the practical point of view, the type of exploits
generated by APEG is mainly denial of service, which can
only cause the original program to crash, failing to result
in a direct control flow hijacking. Therefore, Control Flow
Hijacking Exploit Generation is then put forward.
B. Control Flow Hijacking Exploit Generation
Techniques based on control flow hijacking have been
proposed to overcome the APEG’s defect of patch dependency
and the inability to construct control flow hijacking. Hee-
lan [37] first implements the technique. The classic method
is Automatic Exploit Generation (AEG) [38] proposed by
Thanassis. AEG’s core principle is mainly divided into four
steps: Firstly, locate the location of the vulnerability. Secondly,
get run-time information of the program such as the stack
layout information. Thirdly, generate exploits based on the
above information. Lastly, verify the exploits. AEG is the first
truly automated solution for exploiting control flow oriented
vulnerabilities. There are some limitations with AEG such as
dependence on the source code, the exploit samples being
limited by compilers, and the dynamic operating environments.
To address the above issues, Q [39] later serves as an
exploit hardening system proposed. Based on the research
of AEG and Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) [40], Q is
designed to bypass the memory protection mechanisms like
W
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X and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR),
etc. PloyAEG [41] is proposed that can automatically generate
multiple exploits for a vulnerable program. Rex [42] tracks
formulas for all registers and memory values to create a Proof
Of Vulnerability (POV), and it is implemented in Mechanical
Phish which finished third in the CGC Final Event in 2016.
All of them have improved AEG to some extent, making
the automatic exploits generation technology more feasible.
However, in the context of a broad deployment of defense
solutions against control-flow hijacking attack, most of the
attackers have turned their attention from control-oriented
exploits towards data-oriented exploits.
C. Data-Oriented Exploits Generation
Data-oriented attacks change the path of data flow instead
of changing the basic control flow of the program. Data-
oriented attacks are not well known so far and there are
few corresponding defense solutions. Therefore, data-oriented
exploit generation has better applicability and flexibility.
Under such research background, the team of Liang put
forward a new technique called data-flow stitching that is
implemented by the tool FlowStitch [43]. FlowStitch is the first
scheme for automatic data-oriented exploits generation and
verified to be feasible. However, it has some limitations, for
example, there must be at least one known memory error in the
program as a precondition. Later, they propose Data-Oriented
Programming (DOP) [44] that implements the method to
search, extract and program for the attack code blocks and
the instruction scheduling assignment code blocks in the
actual applications. DOP is Turing-complete as it can execute
arbitrary code and bypass the system defenses like DEP and
ASLR. Above all, automatic vulnerability exploitation always
requires deep semantic understanding that is difficult. So it is
a hot topic and more researches are needed to enhance the
machine analysis of deep semantic in the future.
IV. AUTOMATIC VULNERABILITY PATCHING
Due to some realistic reasons, such as the rapid spread
of worms [45], researchers proposed many automatic patch
technologies to ensure software’s proper function in early
years. These technologies are mainly used to prevent mal-
ware’s hijack. Until recently, automatic patch technology is
gradually penetrating into almost all aspects of software. In
this section, we will introduce automatic vulnerability patching
techniques that mainly focus on automatic patch technology
in software security.
A. The Automatic Patching Process
The automatic patch technique commonly goes through
several routine steps such as fault-locating, patch-generating,
and function-verifying.
1) fault-locating: Fault-locating identifies the location of
defects or failures. In the early stage, researchers located
failures by monitoring programs, such as logging its running
states, and then some researchers use fuzzing to find inputs that
trigger failures. After that, static analysis methods, e.g., AST,
are used. AST uses semantic analysis based methods to find
software defects, and has good prospects. AST analyzes the
structure of a program and provides information for patching.
Monitoring the execution of the program is still an effective
choice for fault-locating when source code is not provided.
2) Patch-generating: Patch-generating is the most impor-
tant step. There are two kinds of patches: vulnerability-tolerant
and vulnerability-eliminating. For the vulnerability-tolerant
patch, two patching strategies are widely used. The first is
implementing an input filter to remove trigger-inputs. This
strategy is used by VSEF [46] and TAP [47]. The other is
implementing a checkpoint mechanism. It is used to save states
before executing vulnerable instructions and roll back to a safe
state when an error occurs. For the vulnerability-eliminating
patch, semantic-based patching method is proposed. This
method called GenProg is first introduced by a team led by
Goues C L. GenProg takes some patch templates, and searches
a patch-space generated by semantic analysis for right patches.
3) Function-verifying: After patches are applied, the ver-
ification of the functionality of the patched software is re-
quired. Currently, the verification step is mainly conducted by
software testing using a variety of test cases provided by the
software designer or generated from software specification.
After the occurrence of GenProg, this kind of verification
technology becomes practical.
In terms of the way of vulnerability patching, this paper di-
vides automatic patching methods into two categories, runtime
state-based repair and detect-based repair. The following two
subsections will describe these methods in detail.
B. Runtime State-based Repair
When a program is running, the following methods will re-
pair the bugs or take some actions to bypass the vulnerabilities
without discontinuing the program.
1) Monitor: To defense against the rapid spread of worms
and other attacks, VSEF [46] combines automatic input fil-
tering and binary-based full execution monitoring to achieve
automatically patching of software.
DieHard [48] aims at repairing heap overflow vulnerabil-
ities. It uses randomization, replication and other methods
to build an approximate infinite heap. Similar to DieHard,
Exterminator [49] addresses buffer overflows and dangling
pointers by exploiting randomization to pinpoint errors and
merging patches to generate a new patch.
ClearView [50] is proposed by jeff et al.. It repairs bugs of
binaries by observing the normal execution of registers and
memory locations on x86 systems automatically. When errors
are found, it repairs errors through correcting the variables
by comparing to normal runtime log. ClearView can alleviate
memory write out of bounds vulnerabilities and invalid change
of control flow vulnerabilities.
2) Rollback: Rx [51] is an automatic repair method pro-
posed by F.Qin et al., which is inspired by the method of
allergy treatment for removing allergens. Based on this idea,
Rx changes the execution environment of the program back to
health when occurring faults. Then Rx will restart the program,
and try to rollback it to the checkpoint-state.
Different from the previous methods, ASSURE [52]
presents the concept of Rescue Point (RP). RP is the location
of a program that detects known errors and needs to restart.
ASSURE can be regarded as an exception handling. It uses
virtual execution to simulate the runtime environment and
explores the reasons to repair the errors such as a memory
write out of bounds and illegally control the transfer, etc.
REASSURE [53] is ASSURE-based with simplifying the
deployment of ASSURE and improving its performance.
C. Detect-based Repair
Detect-based repair mainly uses fuzzing test to filter the
input that can trigger the defect, or, uses AST to analyze and
uses genetic programming to generate a patch to repair the
program, or, repair the defect based on the constraint solving.
Four ways of detect-based repair will be introduced in the
following subsections.
1) Input Filter: Like other early developed automatic patch
methods, Vigilante [45] is also designed to defense worms, and
it generates input filters automatically by self-certifying alerts.
For buffer overflow, TAP [47] designs two repair templates to
recognize, generate and insert source-level patch automatically
to filter input.
2) Search-based Repair: In recent years, researchers devote
genetic programming to automatic patching methods. GenProg
[54] is a success case, it uses genetic programming and extends
it to repair program defects automatically without the need for
formal specification, program annotations or special coding. It
uses structural differencing algorithms and Delta debugging
to further reduce the difference between the patched program
and the original program, in order to achieve the automatic
patching with minimal changes.
Pattern-based Automatic Program Repair (PAR) [55], uses
repair patterns by learning from existing manual patches. Re-
searchers have checked over 60,000 manual patches and found
several common repair patterns for PAR to generate patches
automatically. Although a large amount of time has been spent
on manually creating the repair-templates, researchers declare
that these templates have high reusability, and can be used on
different occasions.
AE [56] is based on GenProg, but it improves the perfor-
mance of the healing process. Because AE formalizes repair
cost in terms of test executions and uses many techniques such
as syntax and data flow analysis to reduce patch search space.
To improve the rate of success for patch generation, the order
of tests should be adjusted. AE also sets the priority to patches
which are the most likely to fail or to succeed.
Like AE, SPR [57] uses subsection repair and conditional
synthesis to further reduce the search space and improve search
efficiency. Propht [58] learns from manual patches to create
correct probabilistic models. Based on these probabilistic
models, the test strategy will sort patches to identify the best
patch for defects or vulnerabilities.
3) Statistical Debugging Metrics: Constraint solving has
been applied to automatic patch technology in recent years.
SemFix [59] is a semantic-based automatic repair method
that combines the symbolic execution, constraint solving, and
program composition. In this method, programs that need to
patch are formulated as constraints through a given set of
tests. And then, SemFix synthesizes patches through semantic
program analytics with dynamic symbolic execution.
DirectFix [60] and Angelix [61] are based on SemFix.
DirectFix differs from all existing repair methods, it combines
the fault locating with the patch generating. DirectFix uses the
MaxSMT solver to generate the minimized modification to the
program. Angelix is based on the angelic forest. Compared
with GenProg and SPR, Angelix is scalable with the ability
of high-quality and multi-line.
4) Standard Semantics: Because new errors will probably
be added when repairing known errors, Gopinath et al. [62]
propose a Specification-based code of conduct for automated
patch technology, using regulation constraints to trim subse-
quent uncertainty and repair misstatements. They use the SAT-
based Alloy tool-set to describe specification constraints and
solve these constraints.
In terms of the above review, great progress has been
made in automatic vulnerability patching. However, it cannot
repair all types of bugs and it is challenging to fix zero-day
vulnerabilities. As the most difficult part, automatic vulner-
ability patching requires better deep semantic understanding.
Therefore the machine understanding of deep semantic can be
regarded as the most challenging research topic, in which the
machine learning will play an important role.
V. MACHINE LEARNING IN SOFTWARE SECURITY
As mentioned in Sec.1, with the success of CGC in 2016,
we are standing at a coming era in which the software
vulnerability detection, exploitation and patching can be done
by machines in an automated and scalable manner. Meanwhile,
recent breakthroughs of Deep Learning (DL) in AlphaGo [3]
bring us new possibilities of utilizing DL-based or other ma-
chine learning-based technologies to improve the performance
of automatic software vulnerability detection, exploitation and
patching. In this section, we provide an extensive survey of
the progress in this field, and discuss the open challenges.
A. Vulnerability Detection and Exploitation
Since vulnerability detection is very different from the
typical problems for which machine learning is motivated,
such as image classification, speech tagging, etc. The most
important issue for utilizing machine learning to detect soft-
ware vulnerabilities is to bridge this intention gap. To this end,
some pioneer works have been published in recent years.
Some researchers try to import outside information that is
needed during program execution to assist the vulnerability
detecting process. For example, Perl et al. [63] propose an
approach that uses code repositories containing meta-data
and code metrics to identify potentially vulnerable com-
mits. They conduct a dataset consisting of 170,860 commits
from 66 C/C++ GitHub projects, including 640 vulnerability-
contributing commits mapped to the CVE IDs. Based on
this dataset, heterogeneous features are extracted and jointly
represented using a bag-of-words model. A Support Vector
Machine (SVM) classifier is built on top of these features and
trained using the dataset to detect the so-called vulnerability-
contributing commits.
Some studies attempt to enhance deep semantic understand-
ing. By extracting the semantic information from the program
to detect vulnerabilities, Zhen Li et al. [64] implement a
deep learning vulnerability detection system called Vulnera-
bility Deep Pecker (VulDeePecker). Deep learning does not
require the expert intervention to generate features, making
the automation possible. However, applying deep learning
to vulnerability detection still requires some guidance. The
authors use a code gadget that has multi-block code lines
(not necessarily consecutive) with semantic dependencies to
represent the software programs. A Bidirectional Long Short-
Term Memory (Bi-LSTM) neural network is built up on top of
these code gadgets and trained using the first vulnerabilities
dataset designed for deep learning to detect. VulDeePecker
detects four vulnerabilities that are not reported in the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) that proves its effectiveness.
For vulnerability exploitation, the semantic information is
also crucial. Wei You et al. [65] find a new method called Sem-
Fuzz to automatically generate a proof-of-concept exploit by
collecting the vulnerability-related texts published by CVE and
Linux Git log. Version information, vulnerability types, and
vulnerability functions for the exploit are provided by CVE.
Linux git logs provide a description of the vulnerability patch.
SemFuzz is a semantic-based fuzzing technology that uses
natural-language processing to extract semantic information by
analyzing vulnerability-related text rather than the code itself.
Using such information, SemFuzz creates a call sequence to
access vulnerable functions and use seed mutation as inputs for
fuzzing until the vulnerability is triggered. In order to test the
validity of SemFuzz, the author collected more than 112 Linux
kernel vulnerability reported by CVE over the past five years.
16% of the vulnerabilities were detected and even zero-day
vulnerabilities and undisclosed vulnerabilities are discovered.
B. Vulnerability Patching
The improvement of deep semantic information under-
standing is still at the core of vulnerability patching. Here
are two main strategies: generate-and-validate approach and
semantics-driven approach. Next, we briefly review the studies
of machine learning applied to the vulnerability patching.
Ripon K. Saha et al. [66] propose a generate-and-validate
technique for object-oriented programs called ELIXIR. The
key to this technique is to use method calls extensively, to build
repair expressions, and to synthesize patches. The authors
use machine learning to rank the concrete repairs, and the
ensuing expansion of the repair space can be filtered. The
features come from the repair semantic information like the
code around the repair location. The authors evaluate ELIXIR
on two datasets: Defects4J and Bugs.jar. The results show
that the number of fixed bug increased significantly under the
condition of expanding the effective search and repair space.
Rahul Gupta et al. [67] propose a semantics-driven and
deep learning-based programming error repair technique called
Deepfix. Deepfix fixes multiple programming errors by re-
peatedly calling trained neural networks. The authors have
set up two types of datasets including correct and erroneous
programs. The authors use the Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU)
model to test 6971 erroneous programs to verify their method.
C. Open Challenges
Machine learning-based techniques can implement automa-
tion better, which indicates a new opportunity to harden the
software security. However, we are still facing challenges when
penetrating the machine learning into this field of software
security. Here we list three typical challenges as follows.
1) The deep semantic understanding: According to the
above review, we can learn that deep semantic information is
crucial for software security. The better semantic understand-
ing, the greater ability for the machine to achieve automatic
vulnerability detection, exploitation and patching. So by uti-
lizing machine learning to implement better deep semantic
understanding is a hot research topic in the future.
2) The binary-based machine learning: Shin et al. [68]
apply the method of recursive neural networks to binary anal-
ysis, but it is not directly applied for vulnerability detection.
Most machine learning algorithms are designed with source
code while binary-based machine learning is rare. Therefore,
binary-oriented machine learning vulnerability detection still
needs to be explored.
3) The open source datasets: The existing datasets are
collected or constructed temporarily according to some spe-
cific purposes. It lacks open source datasets like ImageNet
[69] that has a wide coverage and has a large amount of
semantic information such as comprehensive data type. More
importantly, it can be used for vulnerability detection and
patching based on machine learning. Thus the open source
datasets are necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the development of the Internet, the security issues
caused by software are spreading widely. The autonomous
CRS begin to attract our attention. Many research scholars
have put forward a variety of related techniques attempting to
replace human labor. This paper provides a detailed introduc-
tion to recent research technologies in the areas of automatic
vulnerability detection, exploitation and patching. Moreover,
machine learning in software security is playing an important
role. This paper hereby carried out the latest research works
in the field of machine learning. It also summarizes some
challenges of the machine learning in software security. And
in the future, it is promising to conduct the research work
from the perspective of machine learning on the application
of automatic vulnerability detection, exploitation and patching.
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